Studies find CEO pay and firm performance are linked, but the connection is weaker and less reliable than incentive theories predict.
In better-governed firms, boards adjust pay to performance, and pay-for-performance sensitivity tends to be higher.
Some research finds higher-ability CEOs earn more and lead firms with stronger operating results and market valuations.
Other studies show CEO pay rises with luck, such as oil-price shocks, and that excess pay is associated with underperformance.
Higher incentive pay has been linked to lower future stock returns, and visible high CEO pay can reduce consumer purchase intent.
Stronger evidence: Against
Verdict
Across leading empirical studies, the relationship between CEO pay and firm performance is real but weaker and more fragile than optimal-contracting stories would suggest. Some evidence indicates that when compensation reflects underlying CEO ability, is tied to measurable performance, and channels risk-taking toward productive investment, higher pay can coincide with better outcomes for shareholders. In well-governed settings, boards do adjust pay to performance, and stronger incentives can support value creation.
However, a larger body of influential work shows that very high CEO pay frequently reflects rents, luck, and governance failures. Pay responds strongly to exogenous shocks outside executive control, excess CEO and director compensation is associated with underperformance, and generous incentive packages can predict lower future returns rather than superior ones. Visible pay gaps can also damage brand equity and consumer demand. Overall, the evidence favors skepticism that ever-escalating CEO salaries systematically “pay off” for investors or society. The payoff appears to depend less on paying more in absolute terms and more on the quality of governance and contract design: robust, independent boards, long-horizon metrics, and explicit filters for luck. Without those safeguards, high CEO pay is as likely to be a symptom of captured governance as a driver of superior performance.
Drawing on a panel of 390 UK non-financial firms, this paper documents a positive and significant relationship between CEO pay and firm performance, especially when governance is stronger. Results suggest boards do adjust pay to performance and that better-governed firms exhibit higher pay-for-performance sensitivity, supporting the view that incentive pay can help align CEO and shareholder interests.
Analyzing shocks such as oil-price movements that are outside CEO control, this classic study shows that CEO pay rises about as much with a “lucky” dollar as with a general dollar of performance. Firms with stronger governance attenuate this pay-for-luck, but many do not, indicating that a sizable share of high CEO pay reflects rents extracted under weak oversight rather than returns generated by skill.
Drawing on a panel of 390 UK non-financial firms, this paper documents a positive and significant relationship between CEO pay and firm performance, especially when governance is stronger. Results suggest boards do adjust pay to performance and that better-governed firms exhibit higher pay-for-performance sensitivity, supporting the view that incentive pay can help align CEO and shareholder interests.
Study of 4,410 S&P 1500 firms (2018-2021) found firm performance measured by return on assets and sales positively affects CEO compensation and CEO pay ratio, supporting pay-for-performance alignment.
Longitudinal analysis of top executives in large firms from 1936-2005 finds that CEO compensation correlation with firm performance was remarkably flat from late 1940s to mid-1970s, but much stronger in the past 30 years, indicating a stronger pay-for-performance link in recent decades.
Using US data and an ability index based on past success, this study finds that higher-ability CEOs both earn higher compensation and lead firms with superior operating performance and market valuations. Pay differences are therefore partly explained by underlying managerial ability rather than pure rent extraction, and compensation contracts appear to transmit some of that ability into shareholder value.
This paper examines the “black box” between CEO pay and performance and finds that higher compensation is associated with greater CEO risk-taking behavior, which in turn is positively related to firm performance. The mediation results imply that well-structured incentive packages can induce risk-taking that benefits shareholders, suggesting a mechanism through which high but performance-linked CEO pay may pay off.
Using S&P 1500 firms from 2018–2021, this study finds that accounting and sales performance positively affect both CEO compensation and the CEO-to-median-worker pay ratio, even through the COVID-19 shock. While overall pay levels and ratios rose, the evidence shows that better-performing firms systematically pay more, supporting a partial “pay for performance” interpretation rather than pay being disconnected from results.
Study finds strong evidence of pay-for-performance relationship when examined cumulatively over CEO tenure using realized compensation. Results show CEOs who outperform peer firms receive significantly higher pay-for-performance sensitivity, challenging prior findings of weak relationships.
Analyzing shocks such as oil-price movements that are outside CEO control, this classic study shows that CEO pay rises about as much with a “lucky” dollar as with a general dollar of performance. Firms with stronger governance attenuate this pay-for-luck, but many do not, indicating that a sizable share of high CEO pay reflects rents extracted under weak oversight rather than returns generated by skill.
Meta-analysis of CEO pay determinants analyzing 137 prior studies. Found that firm size accounts for over 40% of variance in CEO pay, while firm performance accounts for less than 5% of variance, suggesting CEO compensation is weakly linked to actual performance outcomes.
Modeling CEO and director pay jointly, this article finds a strong positive association between the two and documents that excess compensation to both groups is linked to weaker firm performance. The pattern is consistent with mutual back-scratching or cronyism, where powerful CEOs and boards inflate each other’s pay at shareholders’ expense, suggesting that very high packages can be a symptom and source of value destruction.
Using UK-listed firms, this study examines whether firms that pay CEOs more—especially via incentive and equity-based components—deliver superior future returns. It finds the opposite: higher incentive pay is associated with lower subsequent stock returns and weaker operating performance, while firms paying at the bottom of the incentive-pay distribution outperform. The results challenge the idea that ever-stronger incentive pay reliably creates shareholder value.
Synthesizing empirical work on CEO compensation, this analysis concludes that the explosion of US CEO pay since the 1970s is poorly explained by improved performance or productivity. Drawing on evidence about pay for luck, weak governance, and the limited impact of many pay packages on shareholder returns, it argues that much of modern CEO pay reflects managerial power and benchmarking rather than value creation, with significant costs for both shareholders and broader inequality.
Across experiments and an event study, this paper shows that high CEO compensation reduces consumer purchase intent and that the negative effect is amplified during brand crises and for high-equity brands. Beyond investor outcomes, very visible CEO pay can therefore damage the firm’s brand and demand, implying that extreme packages may impose indirect costs that offset any incentive benefits.
Study shows CEO compensation complexity is negatively related to firm value and profitability, suggesting that overly complex CEO pay structures reflect agency problems and executive rent extraction rather than justifiable performance incentives.
Study of UK CEO compensation shows that despite relative performance contracts designed to tie pay to performance, CEO pay remains asymmetrically responsive to positive shocks while weakly responding to negative performance, indicating persistent "pay for luck" especially in weakly governed firms.
Frequently asked questions
Is CEO pay tied to company performance?
Partly. Several studies find better-performing firms pay their CEOs more, but a meta-analysis of 137 studies found firm size explains far more of the variation in CEO pay than performance does.
Do CEOs get paid for luck?
Research shows CEO pay often rises with gains outside executive control, such as oil-price movements, about as much as with general performance. Stronger governance reduces this pay-for-luck, but many firms do not curb it.
Do companies that pay CEOs more deliver better returns?
The evidence is mixed. Some studies link higher pay to higher CEO ability and better results, while a study of UK firms found higher incentive pay was associated with lower subsequent stock returns and weaker operating performance.
What makes CEO pay more likely to benefit shareholders?
The evidence suggests governance and contract design matter more than pay levels. Independent boards, long-horizon performance measures, and filtering out luck are associated with a stronger link between pay and results.