Most of the evidence suggests U.S. debt is not at risk of insolvency in the traditional sense, though its long-term trajectory poses serious challenges.
The U.S. borrows in its own currency and issues the main reserve currency, which one study estimates adds about 22% of GDP to its sustainable debt capacity.
A Brookings assessment found a fiscal crisis in the next few decades unlikely, with slow erosion of national wealth the more likely outcome.
Federal interest payments reached $1 trillion in FY 2025 and are the fastest-growing major budget category, according to the American Action Forum.
Bruegel found that stabilizing debt at current interest rates would require primary surpluses of up to 3.25% of GDP, an adjustment it called politically implausible.
Stronger evidence: Against
Verdict
The weight of evidence from 2024-2026 reinforces that U.S. government debt is not at risk of insolvency in the traditional sense, though the fiscal trajectory poses serious long-term challenges. The fundamental structural argument remains: the United States borrows in its own currency, controls monetary policy through an independent Federal Reserve, and issues the world's dominant reserve currency. Choi et al. (2024) quantified this advantage, finding the "exorbitant privilege" adds roughly 22% of GDP to the U.S.'s maximum sustainable debt capacity. Martin-Valmayor et al. (2026) found mean-reverting fiscal dynamics in nearly 200 years of U.S. data, consistent with long-run sustainability.
The most authoritative recent assessment — Edelberg, Harris, and Sheiner at Brookings (2025), subsequently published in the National Tax Journal — concluded that even under dire but realistic projections, a fiscal crisis in the next few decades appears quite unlikely. The primary consequence of rising debt is a gradual erosion of national wealth, not a sudden crisis. J.P. Morgan and Capital Group echoed this view, emphasizing that decades of insolvency warnings have not materialized and that AI-driven productivity growth could further extend fiscal capacity.
That said, the "for" side has grown stronger since the original evidence was compiled. The One Big Beautiful Bill Act (signed July 2025) is projected to add $3-5 trillion to the national debt over a decade. Bruegel's analysis found that stabilizing debt under current interest rates would require primary surpluses of 3.25% of GDP — far beyond political feasibility. CBO modeled a "gradual crisis" in which debt approaching 250% of GDP would reduce per capita income by 8% by 2050. Federal interest payments hit $1 trillion in FY 2025 and are the fastest-growing budget category. The CRFB warned that even the fear of fiscal dominance could become self-fulfilling through inflation expectations.
The critical distinction remains between technical insolvency (near-impossible for a sovereign fiat currency issuer) and functional fiscal distress (plausible under political dysfunction). The Sheiner-Smetters exchange in JPAM (2025) crystallized this: the debate is not over whether the U.S. can pay, but whether it will choose the right policy mix. The risks are real — rising interest costs, political brinkmanship, eroding dollar confidence — but they are governance risks, not solvency risks. The evidence against insolvency remains stronger, but the margin has narrowed.
Kotlikoff argued that the U.S. faces a massive fiscal gap — the difference between projected future spending and revenue — amounting to tens of trillions of dollars, concluding that the nation is effectively bankrupt in present-value terms.
Herndon, Ash, and Pollin found coding errors and selective data exclusions in the Reinhart-Rogoff study, showing that the relationship between high debt and low growth is far weaker than originally claimed and that no clear tipping point exists at 90% of GDP.
Kotlikoff argued that the U.S. faces a massive fiscal gap — the difference between projected future spending and revenue — amounting to tens of trillions of dollars, concluding that the nation is effectively bankrupt in present-value terms.
CRFB modeled fiscal crisis scenarios and warned that high and rising debt can boost interest rates, slow income growth, reduce fiscal space, and weaken national security. They noted that even the fear of debt monetization could trigger an inflation crisis where market actors bake future inflation into expectations, creating self-reinforcing instability.
Ajovalasit, Consiglio, and Zenios analyzed the OBBBA's impact on debt sustainability and found that under current high interest rates, stabilizing debt would require primary surpluses of up to 3.25% of GDP — a politically implausible adjustment. They also documented a spike in U.S. political risk, with the ICRG score dropping 2.5 standard deviations below its historical average, and warned that even a slight growth shortfall could create an unsolvable debt sustainability problem.
Reinhart and Rogoff analyzed data from 44 countries over 200 years and argued that public debt above 90% of GDP is associated with markedly lower economic growth, suggesting that the U.S. debt trajectory poses serious fiscal risks.
CBO modeled a scenario in which U.S. debt approaches 250% of GDP within 25 years without a sharp contraction. Compared to stabilizing debt at 100% of GDP, by 2050 real income per person would be 8% lower, average interest rates on government debt would be 24% higher, and interest payments would consume an additional 225% of revenue — illustrating the compounding damage of the current trajectory.
Cao, Jiang, Lam, and Wang developed a quantitative framework to estimate maximum sustainable debt levels for 170+ countries. They found that sustainable debt estimates are highly sensitive to interest-growth differentials and that public debt could be 20 percentage points higher than projected under adverse scenarios driven by policy uncertainty, tighter financial conditions, and geopolitical tensions.
AAF reported that federal interest payments reached $1 trillion in FY 2025 — the second-largest government expenditure — and are projected to grow 76% over the next decade, from $1.0 trillion in FY 2026 to $1.8 trillion in FY 2035, faster than any other major budgetary category. CBO projects debt will rise from 102% of GDP in FY 2026 to a record 107% by FY 2029.
Khan's 2025 peer-reviewed analysis examines US debt sustainability through primary balance, economic growth, and real interest rates. The study provides empirical analysis of debt dynamics and evaluates whether rising US debt levels can be sustained under current economic conditions.
Dynan (2026) examines US federal debt trajectory driven by population aging, rising health and retirement spending, and mounting interest costs. The paper projects debt will rise substantially and warns that persistent fiscal imbalances would weigh on economic performance and limit capacity to respond to future shocks.
Herndon, Ash, and Pollin found coding errors and selective data exclusions in the Reinhart-Rogoff study, showing that the relationship between high debt and low growth is far weaker than originally claimed and that no clear tipping point exists at 90% of GDP.
Benzoni and Wernick examine the 2025 debt limit episode through financial markets, finding that default risk measured from CDS premiums was only 1.1%, well below the 4-6% risk levels during 2011-2023 debt ceiling episodes, suggesting low near-term insolvency risk.
Blanchard demonstrated that when interest rates on government debt remain below the economy's growth rate — as they have for most of U.S. history — debt rollovers are sustainable and the fiscal costs of debt are substantially lower than commonly assumed.
Using a sovereign default model enhanced with convenience yield and seigniorage features, Choi et al. found that the U.S.'s special status as the global reserve currency and safe asset supplier increases maximal sustainable debt by approximately 22% of GDP. The threat of losing monopoly rents from reserve-currency status creates a powerful incentive to continue servicing debt, making default economically irrational.
Martin-Valmayor et al. applied fractional integration methods to nearly 200 years of U.S. and European fiscal data and found mean-reverting behavior in the differential between interest payments and primary deficits — evidence consistent with long-run debt sustainability. The U.S. showed adjustment dynamics suggesting corrective fiscal mechanisms operate over time.
Capital Group argued there is no indication a crisis is imminent, noting the federal government has operated with deficits for most of its existence without significant challenges to the bond market. They emphasized that long-term debt sustainability is fundamentally a function of future GDP growth, and that technological change — particularly generative AI — could sustain U.S. fiscal capacity if the U.S. maintains its technology leadership.
J.P. Morgan argued that decades of debt crisis warnings have not materialized and that the real risk is not sudden insolvency but a slow, deliberate transfer through financial repression — policymakers tolerating stronger growth and higher inflation to erode the real value of debt. The dollar's reserve-currency status remains unchallenged, and no historical precedent supports a sudden U.S. default scenario.
In a published exchange, Sheiner and Smetters debated U.S. debt crisis risks. Sheiner's relative optimism rests on CBO's baseline projections and the institutional capacity for fiscal adjustment, while Smetters takes a more pessimistic view of the political feasibility of reform. The exchange captures the live academic disagreement over whether the debt trajectory constitutes a crisis risk or a manageable policy challenge.
Edelberg, Harris, and Sheiner conducted a comprehensive assessment of U.S. debt risks and concluded that even under dire but realistic debt projections, federal borrowing is unlikely to spark a fiscal crisis in the next few decades. The most likely consequence is a slow and steady erosion of the capital stock and national wealth — not a sudden crisis. If a crisis does occur, it will likely stem from political missteps rather than the debt level itself.
The debate
Sarah: Since we last debated this, the fiscal picture has gotten measurably worse. Interest payments on the national debt hit $1 trillion in fiscal year 2025 — more than the defense budget. The One Big Beautiful Bill just added another $3 to $5 trillion over the next decade. At what point do the numbers become undeniable?
Tom: The numbers are alarming, I don't dispute that. But alarming and insolvent are fundamentally different things. The Brookings team — Edelberg, Harris, and Sheiner — published the most comprehensive assessment of U.S. debt risks in 2025, and their conclusion was clear: even under dire projections, a fiscal crisis in the next few decades is quite unlikely. The more probable outcome is a slow erosion of national wealth.
Sarah: Slow erosion is just insolvency in slow motion. The CBO modeled a scenario where debt hits 250% of GDP within 25 years. Under that path, real income per person drops 8%, interest rates on government debt jump 24%, and interest costs consume an additional 225% of revenue. That is not a sustainable trajectory by any definition.
Tom: It is not a desirable trajectory — I agree completely. But sustainability and solvency are different questions. The U.S. borrows in its own currency and issues the world's reserve asset. Choi and coauthors at CEPR quantified this: the exorbitant privilege adds roughly 22% of GDP to America's maximum sustainable debt capacity. No other country has that buffer. And Martin-Valmayor's 2026 study of nearly 200 years of U.S. fiscal data found mean-reverting dynamics — the system has historically self-corrected.
Sarah: Historical self-correction required political will that may no longer exist. The Bruegel team analyzed the new spending bill and found that stabilizing debt under current interest rates would require primary surpluses of 3.25% of GDP. When has Congress ever delivered anything close to that? Meanwhile, U.S. political risk scores have fallen 2.5 standard deviations below their historical average. The CRFB warned that even the fear of fiscal dominance could become a self-fulfilling prophecy through inflation expectations.
Tom: Those are real political risks, and I take them seriously. But notice the framing — every scenario you describe is a governance failure, not a solvency failure. The Sheiner-Smetters debate in the Journal of Policy Analysis and Management put it exactly right: the question is not whether the U.S. can pay, but whether it will choose the right policies. J.P. Morgan pointed out that decades of insolvency predictions have failed to materialize. Capital Group argued that AI-driven productivity gains could meaningfully extend fiscal capacity if the U.S. maintains its technology edge.
Sarah: Betting national solvency on AI is not exactly a conservative fiscal strategy. And "decades of warnings haven't materialized" is what people said about housing prices in 2006. The IMF's new P-Theory framework shows that sustainable debt estimates are extremely sensitive to the interest-growth differential. If rates stay elevated and growth disappoints — which the tariff wars make more likely — the math stops working very quickly.
Tom: I hear you, and I think the honest answer is that the margin of safety has shrunk. But let me be precise about what insolvency means. The U.S. government will not fail to make a payment because it ran out of dollars — that is mechanically impossible for a fiat currency issuer. The risk is that it inflates away the real value of its obligations, or that political dysfunction triggers a confidence crisis. Those are serious outcomes, but they are not insolvency. They are policy choices. And the evidence — from Brookings, from the econometric literature, from the structural advantage of reserve-currency status — still says the U.S. has the capacity to manage its debt. Whether it has the political will is a different and much harder question.
Frequently asked questions
Can the U.S. government go bankrupt?
Technical insolvency is considered near-impossible for a country that borrows in its own currency and controls its monetary policy. The larger risk identified in the research is functional fiscal distress caused by political dysfunction, not an inability to pay.
How much does the U.S. spend on interest on the national debt?
Federal interest payments reached $1 trillion in FY 2025, the second-largest government expenditure. They are projected to grow to $1.8 trillion by FY 2035, faster than any other major budget category.
Does high government debt slow economic growth?
A 2010 study by Reinhart and Rogoff linked debt above 90% of GDP to markedly lower growth. A 2014 critique found coding errors and data exclusions in that work and concluded the relationship is far weaker, with no clear tipping point at 90%.
What would happen if U.S. debt keeps rising?
CBO modeled a gradual scenario in which debt approaches 250% of GDP, leaving real income per person 8% lower by 2050 than if debt were stabilized at 100% of GDP. Other researchers expect a slow erosion of national wealth rather than a sudden crisis.