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Should governments implement mandatory genomic surveillance of zoonotic diseases in wildlife and livestock to prevent pandemic spillover?

5 peer-reviewed studies for, 3 against

Key takeaways

Stronger evidence: Against

Verdict

This is a genuinely close scientific debate, and the evidence lands slightly against the specific policy in the question — MANDATORY genomic surveillance of wildlife and livestock as the way to prevent pandemic spillover — even though it strongly supports pandemic prevention in general. The "for" case is real and quantitatively serious. The Global Virome Project (Science, 2018) documents an enormous reservoir of unknown viruses — an estimated 1.67 million viral species in wildlife, up to ~827,000 with human-infective potential — and argues systematic discovery is worth roughly $1.2 billion over a decade. Two independent cost-benefit analyses reinforce the prevention case: Dobson et al. (Science, 2020) put primary prevention at $22-31 billion a year and COVID-19's toll in the trillions, and Bernstein et al. (Science Advances, 2022) reach a similar ~$20 billion figure — both concluding prevention is a small fraction of pandemic costs. Grange et al. (PNAS, 2021) even answer the "untargeted sampling is wasteful" objection with SpillOver, a risk-ranking tool that prioritizes which of 887 wildlife viruses merit attention. But the "against" evidence targets the precise mechanism the question relies on — that surveilling and cataloguing wildlife viruses predicts and prevents spillover. Holmes, Rambaut and Andersen (Nature, 2018) argue that with ~1.6 million unknown viruses, predicting which one will cause a pandemic is impractical, and that money is better spent on real-time genomic surveillance of humans and rapid outbreak response. Wille, Geoghegan and Holmes (PLOS Biology, 2021) show that zoonotic risk cannot be reliably read off genomic or discovery data, because emergence hinges on ecology, evolution, and contingency that ranking schemes capture poorly. Carlson (The Lancet Microbe, 2020), reflecting on the PREDICT program after COVID-19, warns that equating virus-hunting with prevention oversells wildlife virology and diverts resources from diagnostics, primary care, and health-security capacity that demonstrably help. The synthesis: prevention is cost-effective and surveillance has real value, but the evidence does not support a blanket MANDATE for mass genomic surveillance of wildlife and livestock as the primary prevention lever, because discovery-based prediction is weak. The better-supported path is targeted, risk-based monitoring at high-risk interfaces (as Grange enables) combined with strengthened human-facing surveillance and rapid response (as Holmes and Carlson urge) — not a costly, mandatory catalogue of every wildlife virus. On the specific question asked, the skeptics have the stronger case.

Strongest study on each side

Ranked by citation count.

Strongest study for

The costs and benefits of primary prevention of zoonotic pandemics (Science Advances, 2022)

235 citations

Bernstein, Ando, Loch-Temzelides and colleagues estimate that primary prevention of spillover — reducing deforestation, regulating the wildlife trade, and enhanced surveillance and early detection at spillover interfaces — would cost about $20 billion a year. They find this is a small fraction of the expected annual value of lives lost and economic damage from emerging viral diseases, making surveillance-based prevention highly cost-effective.

Strongest study against

Pandemics: spend on surveillance, not prediction (Nature, 2018)

218 citations

Holmes, Rambaut and Andersen argue that with roughly 1.6 million unknown mammalian and avian viruses, trying to predict in advance which will spill over and cause a pandemic is impractical and poor value for money. They contend funds are better spent on real-time genomic surveillance of human populations and rapid response at the point of outbreaks than on cataloguing wildlife viromes — a direct rebuttal to the Global Virome Project approach.

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The evidence

For (5)

The costs and benefits of primary prevention of zoonotic pandemics (Science Advances, 2022)

235 citations

Bernstein, Ando, Loch-Temzelides and colleagues estimate that primary prevention of spillover — reducing deforestation, regulating the wildlife trade, and enhanced surveillance and early detection at spillover interfaces — would cost about $20 billion a year. They find this is a small fraction of the expected annual value of lives lost and economic damage from emerging viral diseases, making surveillance-based prevention highly cost-effective.

Ranking the risk of animal-to-human spillover for newly discovered viruses (PNAS, 2021)

230 citations

Grange, Goldstein, Johnson and colleagues built "SpillOver," an open-access tool that scored 887 wildlife viruses across 31 host, viral, and environmental risk factors. Several newly discovered viruses ranked alongside known high-risk zoonoses near the top of the list, showing a data-driven way to prioritize which wildlife viruses actually merit surveillance — a direct answer to the charge that wildlife sampling is untargeted and wasteful.

The Global Virome Project (Science, 2018)

Carroll, Daszak, Wolfe and colleagues argue that vertebrate wildlife harbor an estimated 1.67 million yet-to-be-discovered viral species, of which roughly 631,000 to 827,000 could have the potential to infect humans. They propose a roughly 10-year, about $1.2 billion global effort to systematically discover and characterize these unknown viruses so public health can prepare for spillover before it happens.

Ecology and economics for pandemic prevention (Science, 2020)

Dobson, Pimm, Hannah and colleagues estimate that primary prevention — monitoring and reducing the wildlife trade, curbing tropical deforestation, and viral surveillance and discovery — would cost on the order of $22 to $31 billion a year. Set against the multi-trillion-dollar mortality and economic toll of COVID-19, they argue prevention is roughly 2% of pandemic costs, a strong cost-benefit case for proactive spillover prevention.

Predictive multi-omic biomarkers for urban zoonotic spillover detection: an integrative review (Frontiers in Public Health, 2025)

This integrative review synthesizes multi-omics approaches including viromics, host transcriptomics, and microRNA profiling to create a predictive framework for early detection of zoonotic spillover in wildlife. The paper demonstrates how integrated genomic surveillance can shift from reactive to anticipatory risk profiling, supporting One Health strategies for pandemic prevention.

Against (3)

Pandemics: spend on surveillance, not prediction (Nature, 2018)

218 citations

Holmes, Rambaut and Andersen argue that with roughly 1.6 million unknown mammalian and avian viruses, trying to predict in advance which will spill over and cause a pandemic is impractical and poor value for money. They contend funds are better spent on real-time genomic surveillance of human populations and rapid response at the point of outbreaks than on cataloguing wildlife viromes — a direct rebuttal to the Global Virome Project approach.

How accurately can we assess zoonotic risk? (PLOS Biology, 2021)

Wille, Geoghegan and Holmes argue that judging a virus's zoonotic or pandemic risk from genomic and discovery data alone is unreliable, because whether a virus actually emerges depends on host ecology, evolution, and contingent factors that sequence-based ranking schemes capture poorly. Cataloguing wildlife viruses, they caution, does not translate into accurate prediction of which will spill over.

From PREDICT to prevention, one pandemic later (The Lancet Microbe, 2020)

Colin Carlson critiques the common rhetorical link between viral discovery and pandemic prevention, arguing it oversells basic wildlife virology and diverts funding and attention from the things that demonstrably help — outbreak surveillance, diagnostics, primary health care, and health-security capacity. He warns against equating virus-hunting in wildlife with actually preventing pandemics.

The debate

Lisa: Prevention here is almost absurdly cost-effective. Dobson and colleagues in Science estimated that monitoring the wildlife trade, slowing deforestation, and doing viral surveillance would run $22 to 31 billion a year. COVID-19 cost the world trillions. Bernstein's team got a similar number — about $20 billion. Spending a couple of percent of the damage to prevent the next pandemic is an easy call.

James: I agree prevention is cheap relative to a pandemic — but notice what is doing the work in those estimates. It is reducing the wildlife trade and deforestation, not mandatory genomic cataloguing of every virus in wildlife and livestock. That specific piece is where the evidence gets shaky.

Lisa: Shaky how? The Global Virome Project laid out the scale: something like 1.67 million unknown viruses in wildlife, hundreds of thousands potentially able to infect people. You cannot prepare for what you have never seen. Discovering and characterizing them is basic preparedness.

James: But discovery is not prediction. Holmes, Rambaut and Andersen made exactly this point in Nature in 2018 — with 1.6 million unknown viruses, guessing in advance which one goes pandemic is a needle-in-a-haystack problem. They argued the money is better spent on real-time surveillance of humans and fast outbreak response.

Lisa: That was before we had better targeting. Grange and colleagues built SpillOver, which scored 887 wildlife viruses on 31 risk factors and pushed the genuinely dangerous ones to the top. That is exactly the "surveil smartly, not blindly" answer to the wastefulness charge.

James: Ranking tools are progress, but Wille, Geoghegan and Holmes showed in PLOS Biology that you cannot reliably read pandemic risk off genomes and discovery data — emergence depends on ecology, evolution, and luck that those scores miss. And Carlson, looking back at the PREDICT program after COVID, warned that selling virus-hunting as "prevention" pulls funding away from diagnostics and primary health care that actually save lives.

Lisa: So you would just wait for the next spillover to show up in a hospital?

James: No — I would surveil aggressively, but at the human-animal interface and in people, and I would strengthen response capacity. What I would not do is write a blanket legal mandate to genomically catalogue all wildlife and livestock viruses on the theory that the catalogue predicts pandemics. The evidence for that link is the weakest part of the whole plan.

Lisa: I can live with that framing. Fund prevention, fund targeted surveillance where the risk is highest, and fund the human-side detection and response — just do not pretend a mandatory virus census is the thing that saves us.

Frequently asked questions

Can scientists predict which animal virus will cause the next pandemic?

Not reliably, according to several researchers. With an estimated 1.6 million or more unknown viruses, and emergence driven by ecology, evolution and chance, genomic data alone is a weak predictor of spillover.

Is pandemic prevention worth the cost?

Cost-benefit analyses suggest yes. Estimates put primary prevention, including reducing deforestation, regulating wildlife trade and surveillance, at roughly $20 to $31 billion a year, a small fraction of the costs of a pandemic like COVID-19.

What is the Global Virome Project?

It is a proposed roughly 10-year, about $1.2 billion effort to discover and characterize unknown viruses in wildlife. Supporters say it would help prepare for spillover, while critics argue the money is better spent on human surveillance and outbreak response.

What do critics recommend instead of mass wildlife virus surveillance?

They favor real-time genomic surveillance of human populations, rapid response at the point of outbreaks, and investment in diagnostics, primary health care and health-security capacity. Targeted, risk-based monitoring at high-risk animal-human interfaces is also supported.

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