The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare (Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2019)
Documents that the 2018 tariff increases generated substantial U.S. tariff (customs) revenue collections, even as costs were borne domestically.
All topics3 peer-reviewed studies for, 5 against
Tariffs do raise tariff (customs) revenue in the narrow accounting sense: empirical work on the 2018–2019 U.S. tariff episode documents substantial tariff revenues collected after rates increased, confirming the mechanical link between higher tariffs and government receipts conditional on continued imports. However, “increase tax revenue” is usually interpreted as improving public finances overall, and here the evidence is less favorable. The same studies that measure tariff revenue also find large domestic incidence and sizable welfare losses, meaning the revenue is partly offset by deadweight loss and by reductions in real income. In addition, tariffs can disrupt supply chains and production networks, which can depress investment, output, and profitability—shrinking broader tax bases such as income and corporate taxes. Retaliation and reduced trade volumes further limit how much revenue tariffs can reliably generate at higher rates.\n\nNet: tariffs can increase tariff revenue, especially at modest rates, but they are a costly and unreliable instrument for raising government revenue in overall fiscal terms. Because the claim is commonly taken to imply a beneficial or net revenue-raising policy, the stronger side is against.
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Documents that the 2018 tariff increases generated substantial U.S. tariff (customs) revenue collections, even as costs were borne domestically.
Finds large welfare losses and adverse trade responses during the tariff episode; even with tariff revenue, deadweight loss and retaliation imply weak net fiscal desirability.
Documents that the 2018 tariff increases generated substantial U.S. tariff (customs) revenue collections, even as costs were borne domestically.
Multi-sector Ricardian model finds revenue-maximizing tariffs of 20-30 percent, demonstrating tariffs can substantially increase government revenue before reaching Laffer curve peaks. Study calibrated to 2025 US trade war data.
Clausing and Obstfeld empirically analyze how Trump's 2025 tariffs raise substantial government revenues, demonstrating tariff revenue potential. They find tariff rates around 45% would maximize annual revenue (~$640B), though efficiency losses would offset much of the gain.
Finds large welfare losses and adverse trade responses during the tariff episode; even with tariff revenue, deadweight loss and retaliation imply weak net fiscal desirability.
Furceri et al. analyze 151 countries over 1963-2014 using impulse response functions, finding that tariff increases lead to economically significant declines in domestic output and productivity in the medium term. Since these macroeconomic contractions reduce the overall tax base and economic activity, tariffs are ineffective at sustainably increasing government tax revenue when accounting for broader economic feedback effects.
Shows tariffs can impose large supply-chain adjustment costs and distort production networks, implying broader economic losses that can reduce other tax bases.
The average US tariff rate jumped from 2.6% to 13% over 2025, and a new NY Fed study finds that roughly 90% of that burden landed on American firms and consumers — not foreign exporters. In other words, tariffs functioned less like a tax on trading partners and more like a tax on the US itself.
Federal Reserve researchers find that 26 percent of tariff increases pass through to consumer prices across supply chains, with direct effects on imports occurring quickly but indirect domestic producer effects taking 9-12 months. This substantial price transmission demonstrates tariffs impose significant economic costs beyond revenue generation, reducing their net fiscal effectiveness as a revenue tool.
Yes. Tariffs are collected as customs revenue, and studies of the 2018 and 2025 U.S. tariff increases document substantial collections as long as imports continue.
The evidence points mostly to domestic firms and consumers. A New York Fed study found roughly 90% of the 2025 U.S. tariff burden landed on Americans rather than foreign exporters, and other Fed research finds tariff increases pass through to consumer prices over 9-12 months.
Yes. Because higher tariffs reduce imports, revenue eventually peaks and then falls, a Laffer curve pattern. Studies of the 2025 tariffs estimate revenue-maximizing rates of about 20-30 percent in one model and around 45 percent in another.
They can. An IMF analysis of 151 countries found tariff increases lead to declines in output and productivity, and research on supply chains shows tariffs can disrupt production, both of which can shrink broader tax bases such as income and corporate taxes.