The evidence overall leans against the filibuster as currently structured and used, favoring reform or elimination.
Data on majority-party priorities from 1985 to 2020 show the filibuster is a significant barrier to passing a majority's agenda.
Research finds the filibuster became more consequential for lawmaking after norms changed in the 1970s and its use expanded.
Some research finds the filibuster can increase debate and convey useful information in bargaining, though other work suggests it impedes deliberation.
One analysis found that in half of recent Congresses, successful filibustering minorities represented more Americans than the majorities they blocked.
Stronger evidence: Against
Verdict
The case for keeping the filibuster is strongest when you treat the Senate as a deliberative, consensus-forcing institution rather than a majoritarian lawmaking engine. Research suggests the filibuster can increase legislative discussion and, in theory, improve information aggregation and bargaining by making obstruction costly and potentially informative.\n\nBut modern practice looks less like occasional, high-salience signaling and more like a routine supermajority requirement. Evidence on majority-party agendas indicates the filibuster is a significant barrier to passing prioritized legislation, helping explain why Congress often produces fewer major laws even when a party controls both chambers and the presidency. Work on pivotal politics likewise finds the filibuster pivot becomes more consequential after norms changed in the 1970s, consistent with a shift toward systematically constraining lawmaking.\n\nNet: the filibuster may improve deliberation at the margin, but the dominant, repeated effect in contemporary U.S. politics is to raise the threshold for action and expand gridlock. If the question is whether to support the filibuster as currently structured and used, the evidence weight favors opposition (reform or elimination).
Douglas Dion, Frederick J. Boehmke et al. · 11 citations
Models the filibuster as informative costly signaling and finds it has conveyed meaningful information historically, supporting arguments that it can structure bargaining rather than being pure obstruction.
Howell and Fu empirically analyze whether the filibuster enhances legislative debate as advocates claim. Finding that changes in the filibuster rarely coincide with marked differences in legislative discussion, and where differences appear they suggest the filibuster impedes rather than facilitates robust deliberation.
Douglas Dion, Frederick J. Boehmke et al. · 11 citations
Models the filibuster as informative costly signaling and finds it has conveyed meaningful information historically, supporting arguments that it can structure bargaining rather than being pure obstruction.
Eidelson's empirical analysis shows that in half of recent Congresses, successful filibustering minorities actually represented more Americans than the majorities they blocked, making these "majoritarian filibusters." The paper argues this complicates the standard majority-rule critique and suggests the filibuster may serve important democratic functions by preventing legislation that narrow Senate majorities—representing Senate minorities of Americans—could impose.
Howell and Fu empirically analyze whether the filibuster enhances legislative debate as advocates claim. Finding that changes in the filibuster rarely coincide with marked differences in legislative discussion, and where differences appear they suggest the filibuster impedes rather than facilitates robust deliberation.
Using data on majority-party agenda priorities (1985–2020), finds the filibuster is a significant barrier to enacting a majority agenda, reinforcing claims that it contributes to policy gridlock.
Finds the filibuster pivot becomes empirically consequential in the post-1970 era of expanded filibuster use, supporting the view that modern filibustering can materially constrain lawmaking.
Using data on coverage of failed cloture motions over two decades, this study shows that detailed reporting on filibuster obstruction leads citizens to perceive Senate procedures as less fair and reduces support for the underlying policies being blocked, suggesting the filibuster's negative democratic effects.
Frequently asked questions
Does the filibuster cause gridlock in Congress?
Research on majority-party agendas finds the filibuster is a significant barrier to enacting prioritized legislation. This helps explain why Congress often passes fewer major laws even when one party controls both chambers and the presidency.
Does the filibuster improve Senate debate?
The evidence is mixed. Some research finds it can increase legislative discussion and information exchange, while other analysis finds changes in the filibuster rarely coincide with differences in discussion and, where they do, it appears to impede deliberation.
Does the filibuster protect the majority of Americans or the minority?
One analysis found that in half of recent Congresses, filibustering Senate minorities represented more Americans than the majorities they blocked. This complicates the common argument that the filibuster simply lets a minority override the majority.
How does the filibuster affect public opinion?
A study of news coverage of failed cloture votes found that detailed reporting on filibuster obstruction led people to view Senate procedures as less fair. It also reduced support for the policies being blocked.